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Abstract 
Clark and Chalmers propose that the mind extends further than skin and skull. If they are right, then 
we should expect this to have some effect on our way of knowing our own mental states. If the 
content of my notebook can be part of my belief system, then looking at the notebook seems to be a 
way to get to know my own beliefs. However, it is at least not obvious whether self-ascribing a belief 
by looking at my notebook is a case of introspection the same way that knowing my non-extended 
beliefs is. Traditionally this sort of introspection is thought to be privileged and special in ways that 
the extended introspection case seems not to be. There is nothing privileged about looking at my 
notebook. Anyone could do it. The aim of the paper is to find out how to understand extended 
introspection and whether there is something privileged and special about knowing one’s own 
extended beliefs. Moreover, the notebook case has close analogs using 21st century technology. It 
seems possible to know our beliefs that are extended to smartphones, wearable technology or a 
cloud-based data store. First, I present the case of extended introspection. I then discuss whether it 
should be understood as ordinary introspection or as mind-reading. Both seem to be bad fits, which 
finally prompts an original account for extended introspection based on epistemic rules. 
 
The Case of Extended Introspection1 
Let us start with a story about Otto: 
Otto suffers from Alzheimer's disease, and like many Alzheimer's patients, he relies on 
information in the environment to help structure his life. Otto carries a notebook around 
with him everywhere he goes. When he learns new information, he writes it down. When he 
needs some old information, he looks it up. For Otto, his notebook plays the role usually 
played by a biological memory. In short, Otto has beliefs extending to the notebook. One day 
I meet Otto in the streets of New York. Out of curiosity I ask him “Otto, I know where the 
museum is, but do you believe the museum is on 53rd street?” Otto looks at his notebook, 
finds the right entry, and answers “I believe the museum is on 53rd Street.”2 
 
1 Special thanks to Giada Fratantonio, Grace Helton, Jesper Kallestrup, Aidan McGlynn and two anonymous 
reviewers for feedback on earlier versions of this paper. Large parts were presented at the University of 
Edinburgh WIP seminar and the conference ‘Minds, Selves and 21st Century Technology’ at the New University 
of Lisbon. Further thanks go to the audiences at these events. 
2 This is different from the extended self-knowledge case by Carter and Pritchard (Forthcoming), which has the 
self-ascription written down in the notebook: “[…] For example, when he learns new information about his own 
mental states (i.e., beliefs, feelings, desires, etc.) – information about his mental states which would be lost in 
biological storage – he writes it down in the notebook. Likewise, when he needs some old information about 




At face value in this story Otto self-ascribes a belief state by looking at the notebook. But this leads 
straight into conflicting intuitions: 
• On one hand Otto appears to simply detect his belief. The story is set up in a way that he has 
beliefs extending to the notebook, so the way to detect these beliefs is to look at the 
notebook. And intuitively, what else is introspection other than directly detecting your own 
beliefs? 
• On the other hand Otto appears to base his self-ascription on evidence that I, standing next 
to Otto, can use just as well to ascribe the belief to Otto. And this is certainly not what we 
intuitively think introspection is like. 
With these conflicting intuitions at hand, we need to search for a proper way to understand 
extended introspection. Otto definitely self-ascribes a mental state by looking at the notebook. But 
what kind of self-ascription are we dealing with here? This is the core question I am going to address 
in this paper. I start by stepping back and taking a quick overview on the notion of extended belief as 
the basis for extended introspection. I then consider the standard options for self-ascribing mental 
states: introspection and self-directed mind-reading. I discuss these in turn and show that both are 
not a great fit. This leads into a dialectic dilemma with no clear way out. I then propose a unique 
account of extended introspection based on epistemic rules, inspired by Alex Byrne’s (2005) account 
of introspection. On my proposal extended introspection turns out to be reliable, because self-
verifying under extended belief condition. Moreover, I show in the final section that my solution for 
the case of Otto and his notebook is also applicable to 21st century versions of the case, relying on 
smartphones, wearable technology and the internet. 
 






My story about Otto introspecting extended beliefs builds on the Otto case presented by Clark and 
Chalmers (1998). 3 The central idea behind ascribing Otto plus notebook an extended belief lies in the 
fact that the notebook plays the role usually played by biological memory. This idea features in the 
argument as the parity principle: 
Parity Principle: If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process 
which, were it to go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the 
cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process 
(Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 8). 
 
The notebook does the job of the biological memory, because Otto consistently uses it just like we 
usually use a biological memory. Whenever he gets new information he writes it down. Whenever he 
wants to remember something he looks it up in the notebook. And the notebook is with him all the 
time. So why not straight up accept the notebook as Otto’s memory? 
The difference in location is not a well-motivated rationale to dismiss the similarities, if we follow 
Clark and Chalmers. However, this needs a further, more detailed look. Even if we follow the parity 
principle, we need to say something more on the notebook’s role in Otto’s cognitive processes. Not 
every notebook makes a good case for something that “we would have no hesitation in recognizing 
as part of the cognitive process,” that is in this case, as part of memory. I personally use notebooks 
every once in a while. But if you were to observe my sporadic looks at the notes, you would surely 
hesitate to call my notebook part of my memory. Moreover, sometimes I write notes so illegibly that 
there is no way to decipher the content later on. Other times I find myself disagreeing with my notes 
– “I can’t have meant that,” I say to myself. And finally, often my notebook is just not with me, 
whereas my biological memory is consistently with me. Or at least I cannot remember the cases in 
which it was not. In short: My notebook’s role is very differently from biological memory. We have to 
 
3 Clark (2010) explicitly allows that the ‘reading in’ of information from devices might count as introspection 
depending on how one classifies the overall case. He states that “[f]rom our perspective the systemic act is 
more like an act of introspection than one of perception” (p. 56). 
4 
 
be careful not to trivialize extended beliefs in a way that obscures their differences with non-
extended beliefs. 
Clark and Chalmers are fully aware of this concern. Therefore they propose four conditions that 
external aids have to satisfy to play a role in an extended belief (Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 2010). 
External aids must be: 
(i) consistently available,  
(ii) readily accessible,  
(iii) automatically endorsed, and 
(iv) present because they were consciously endorsed in the past. 
They are slightly skeptical about the previous endorsement condition, claiming that this requirement 
is debatable. The appeal of (iv) is that by getting rid of it one might lose grip of the difference 
between remembering and relearning. However, insofar as (iv) requires conscious endorsement, 
which is an internal condition, (iv) seems to rob the extended belief thesis of its core motivation. The 
cognitive work would not be extended enough, so to speak (cf. Bernecker (2014, p. 5)). For my 
purposes condition (iv) is not important, so I leave the debate open. However, conditions (ii) and (iii) 
will become important later on. Fortunately, they are generally accepted as requirements for 
extended beliefs.  
Clark (2008) and Menary (2007) introduce additional conditions of two-way interactions. The idea is 
that the interactions between the external aid and the person have to be connected in such a way 
that they continuously affect the other. Clark calls this continuous reciprocal causation, Menary 
cognitive integration. An old-fashioned, paper-based book, for instance, would not fit this criterion 
because the reader does not affect the book sufficiently. For my purposes the conditions (i) to (iii) 
above are enough, so I can stay neutral on any further requirements. I will also remain neutral on 
whether the analogy to memory works as well as Clark and Chalmers want it to. The use of 
notebooks can fail more frequently and in different ways than our biological memory, which might 
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undercut the parallel drawn by the argument for the extended mind (cf. Rupert (2004), Sterelny 
(2004)). However, for the present purpose of discussing extended introspection, I will assume that 
the case can be made in favor of Clark’s and Chalmers’s picture. Hence, my approach can be seen as 
a discussion under a conditional: What should we think of introspection of extended beliefs, if there 
are extended beliefs and they can be roughly characterized by conditions (i) to (iii). 
There is a final worry to address concerning the focus on the simple Otto case. The case is highly 
idealized. Why should we care about this case at all? Perhaps looking at other, more realistic 
scenarios requires different conditions or dimensions of integration (as discussed in Sutton (2006), 
Sutton et al. (2010), Sterelny (2010), Menary (2010), and Heersmink (2015))? After all, today’s 
technological gadgets are more complex than the simple notebook. My first response here is to point 
out that the case does not strike me as unrealistic, even though it involves an uncommon situation. 
Moreover, there are sufficiently similar cases featuring individuals and smartphones or smartwatches 
that satisfy the same conditions (i) to (iii). For these cases my discussion should still be applicable. I 
am going to discuss one paradigmatic case more in depth towards the end, but I am now going to 
address the idea that similar cases are plausible featuring 21st century technology. Fortunately, such 
a scenario has already been provided by Paul Smart (2018). He presents the following case Otto++: 
Otto++ is a neurologically impaired individual who is biologically identical to Otto. Otto++ has 
just purchased a shiny new smartphone and augmented reality glasses. Otto++ spends some 
time configuring his phone by installing a variety of apps. He then carries his phone with him 
wherever he goes. In order to ensure that he has access to relevant information, Otto++ 
installs an app that enables him to record important pieces of information. The app, 
however, does not store information locally on the device. Instead, it relies on a semantically 
enabled, cloud-based personal data store that stores information in a linked data format. In 
order to access his personal data store, Otto++ installs an app that enables him to quickly 
retrieve important items of information using an intuitive graphical user interface. He also 
links his phone to his augmented reality glasses so that relevant information from his data 
store can be presented within his visual field. One day, while on a trip to New York City, 
Otto++ decides he would like to visit MoMA. He automatically says the word “MOMA” out 
loud. His phone executes a semantic query against his personal information repository and 
retrieves information about MoMA. A set of directional indicators appear within Otto++’s 




Smart argues that Otto++ still satisfies conditions equivalent to my (i) to (iii). To show that we have to 
unpack the story a little. One important difference to the notebook case is that Otto++ does not store 
information on any particular device. Otto++ stores the information on a cloud-based personal data 
store that can be accessed with various different devices. He carries some of these devices with him, 
but he could in principle also use a friend’s smartphone if needed. Moreover, the information is 
stored in a specific format4 such that it can be retrieved quickly and easily based on queries. This is 
meant to counteract the difficulties of accessing a specific piece of information in a large database. 
These features combined allow Otto++ to have the information constantly available and readily 
accessible, at least to a degree similar to biological memory. Hence, the case passes (i) and (ii). 
Condition (iii) appears to be satisfied as well. There is nothing in the case that prevents Otto++ from 
automatically endorsing the information retrieved from his personal cloud-based data store. We can 
even stipulate that (iv) is satisfied. Simply suppose that information can only be uploaded to the data 
store by Otto++ himself and (iv) is met. Given these similarities Smart suggests that “[…] the case of 
Otto++ is sufficiently similar to the original case […]” (2018, p. 279). I agree. Hence, we can imagine 
an Otto++ case for extended introspection as well. Otto++ apparently can come to know what he 
believes by suitably attending to his cloud-based data store. Moreover, I seem to be able to come to 
know what Otto++ believes by suitably attending to Otto++’s cloud-based data store. 
My plan is to focus on the simpler case of Otto and his notebook and then discuss whether 
introspection in the Otto++ case can be explained by the same strategy as the simpler case. The focus 
on the notebook case makes the discussion a little easier, without significant drawbacks. 
Nevertheless, it is important to point to potential problems in generalizing from the simple case to 
more complex cases, such as Otto++. I will respond to these problems towards the end. However, I 
will not discuss speculative cases involving belief constituting cognitive enhancements that are 
directly connected to the brain. I find these scenarios still rather alien and it is difficult to have clear 
intuitions about them. 
 
4 For details on the format see Smart (2018, pp. 273-274). 
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Extended Introspection as Introspection 
To find out whether the extended introspection case is a genuine case of introspection, we need to 
define our criterion for such genuine introspection. A good starting point for doing so is to look at our 
intuitive judgments about introspection, and most importantly what they are contrasted to. The two 
important points of contrast are first, knowledge of the non-mental world; and second, knowledge of 
other people’s mental states. Introspection appears to be different to both. Self-knowledge seems to 
some extent privileged and peculiar (Byrne, 2005). It is privileged insofar as one’s beliefs about one’s 
own mental states are more likely to amount to knowledge than one’s beliefs about other’s mental 
states or the external world. Moreover, they are peculiar, insofar as they are formed by a special 
method or way of knowing. Call this the cognitive access view of self-knowledge. Cognitive access 
accounts come in different shapes. For instance, they can accept a peculiar detectivist method of 
introspection (e.g. Armstrong (1968), Nichols and Stich (2003), Goldman (2006), Macdonald (2014))5 
or an empiricist transparency story as in Byrne (2005), and Fernández (2013).  
The cognitive access view is not the only description of self-knowledge available. For instance, 
self/other parity accounts of self-knowledge argue that the specialness of self-knowledge is 
overstated. Self-beliefs are largely6 formed by the same processes we use to attribute mental states 
to others (cf. Carruthers (2011), Cassam (2014)). Moreover, agentialist (sometimes called rationalist 
(Gertler, 2011)) positions (e.g. Burge (1996), Moran (2001), Bilgrami (2006)) understand privilege and 
peculiarity not in terms of better access, but with a particular first-personal connection between 
agents and their mental states. For Moran (2001) this particular connection is also the basis for the 
transparency of beliefs, that is, that one can know whether one believes that p by attending to the 
question of whether p is true. Agentialist accounts accept that self-belief is special because it is about 
my mental states, and I am responsible for my beliefs. Self-knowledge in this conception is important 
as a precondition for critically reflecting on one’s own mental states. 
 
5 These lists are not exhaustive. 
6 ‘Largely’ because they usually limit the parity to propositional attitudes. 
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For this paper I will restrict myself to the cognitive access view due to limited space. Hence, I 
understand privileged access for introspection as a person being more reliable in self-ascribing 
mental states than in ascribing mental states to other people. Moreover, I take peculiar access to 
denote some sort of peculiar way of knowing one’s own mental states, compared to knowing other 
people’s mental states (‘mind-reading’). 
With the features of privileged access and peculiar access as the defining features for introspection 
we can start looking at whether extended introspection presents us with these features. When Otto 
self-ascribes his belief by looking at the notebook, does he have privileged and peculiar access? 
The first step to investigate his privileged position is to consider whether Otto is reliable. Clearly he is 
in the way the story is set up. Otto has, by stipulation, the extended belief that the museum is 
located on 53rd street. When I ask him, he looks at the notebook and avows that he believes the 
museum is on 53rd street. And in doing so, he makes a correct statement. It is true that he has this 
belief. Even more so, it seems very difficult for Otto to be wrong about himself in this case. Given 
that the notebook is consistently available, readily accessible, and automatically endorsed, Otto is 
highly reliable in looking at the notebook and self-ascribing the belief. In nearly all nearby possible 
worlds in which Otto looks at the notebook to self-ascribe the belief, he will read the notebook 
correctly, understand what is written in the notebook and successfully attribute the belief to himself. 
If this was not the case, then Otto would fail to have the appropriate connection to the notebook and 
not have an extended belief. But I stipulated the extended belief conditions to be satisfied. Hence 
Otto has to be reliable. 
However, is Otto more reliable than other people looking at his notebook? Privileged access requires 
more than just reliability. It requires being more reliable than other people in attributing mental 
states to Otto. Consider the following take on Otto: 
Otto suffers from Alzheimer's disease, and like many Alzheimer's patients, he relies on 
information in the environment to help structure his life. Otto carries a notebook around 
with him everywhere he goes. When he learns new information, he writes it down. When he 
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needs some old information, he looks it up. For Otto, his notebook plays the role usually 
played by a biological memory. I look at Otto’s notebook and read that the museum is at the 
53rd street. Therefore, I judge that Otto believes the museum is at 53rd street. 
 
Is my belief that Otto believes the museum is at 53rd street reliably formed? This depends on how we 
individuate the process. If the process in question is “looking at notebooks” in general, then it 
probably is not. However, given that I stipulated Otto’s extended belief, it seems the answer is a clear 
yes if we individuate the process based on looking at Otto’s notebook. That is, if I ascribe Otto beliefs 
based on looking at his notebook, I will be highly reliable. As long as I can read Otto’s handwriting 
and understand his language, I will end up with true beliefs about Otto’s extended beliefs.7 Therefore 
I seem to be equally reliable as Otto in ascribing extended beliefs to Otto. Otto is not privileged. 
Perhaps I am a little too quick here. One might bring up at least two objections. First, one may claim 
that there is a sense in which Otto is privileged. Otto has his notebook with him all the time, whereas 
I don’t have the same kind of permanent access. So he has better access after all! To this I respond 
that this is not the right sort of privilege that I am talking about. It is important to distinguish two 
kinds of privileged access here. First, one can have ‘accidentally’ privileged access because one is 
more often in possession of the relevant evidence, but that evidence (or sufficiently similar evidence) 
is in principle accessible for other people. Second, one can have ‘essentially’ privileged access, when 
the evidence (or sufficiently similar evidence) is not in principle accessible for other people. Otto 
seems to have accidentally privileged access to his extended belief, but no essentially privileged 
access. And it is the latter that is of interest here. If I were to follow Otto all the time and look at his 
notebook constantly there would not be an extended belief of his that he knows but I do not. 
Second, one can argue that one needs to have reasons to base judgements of Otto’s beliefs on the 
notebook. One needs to know not only that this is Otto’s notebook, but also that Otto is related to 
the notebook in a way that satisfies the conditions for extended belief. I can accept the former, but 
deny the latter. One needs some reason to ascribe a belief based on the notebook, but knowing that 
 
7 And there seems little reason to give Otto any privilege with reading and understanding the notebook, or at 
least nothing that could not be removed by modifying the case slightly. 
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this is Otto’s notebook is enough.8 After all, Otto himself does not need to know that the extended 
belief conditions are met. He just needs to look at the notebook and self-ascribe the belief. The same 
applies to me ascribing mental states to Otto by looking at his notebook. I need to have some reason 
why this notebook relates to Otto’s beliefs, but those reasons need not entail any of Otto’s beliefs. 
These reasons are only necessary to prompt me to ascribe a belief on the basis of the notebook. They 
need not be reasons that guarantee the truth of my ascription. 
What about peculiar access? Is there anything special about Otto’s self-ascription? At first glance 
what Otto does and what I do when we ascribe a belief based on the notebook seems not that 
different. We both look at the very same thing and use it as a basis for a belief ascription. It is the 
same notebook. Sure, he has access to the notebook constantly, but that does not change the fact 
that when we both look at it to ascribe a mental state, we do the same thing. Otto might use the 
notebook for much more, but for this single belief-forming process it is hard to find a difference. That 
the notebook constitutes his first-order belief does not influence the second-order belief formation. 
Moreover, there is no reason to assume more inferential work being done by me than Otto. Sure, I 
need to recognize that this is Otto’s notebook. But so does Otto. I don’t see any reason why I would 
need any additional inferential step that Otto does not need. I can treat whatever is written in the 
notebook as direct evidence for Otto’s belief, just as Otto does. Gertler (2007) uses this observation 
to argue against the existence of extended beliefs. As I will show later this is not the route that I want 
to take. However, Gertler is right that this symmetry between Otto and me is bad news for peculiar 
access and overall bad news for extended introspection as a subspecies of genuine introspection. 
 
8 This includes knowing something about the function of a notebook. Some knowledge of the function is 
necessary to distinguish one’s notebook from a scrap of paper lying around. That it is my notebook and not a 
random scrap of paper provides a prima facie reason to attribute to myself the content. Thanks to Grace Helton 
for pointing out this issue. 
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Extended Introspection as Mind-Reading 
Mental state ascriptions are commonly assumed to be either introspectively formed, or based on 
mind-reading.9 I just argued that extended introspection does not fit the criteria of privileged and 
peculiar access, so it does not look like it goes into the introspection category. One should then 
expect a better fit with mind-reading. And if so, calling it ‘extended introspection’ might actually be 
misleading. To see whether this is true I want to start with a rough and ready characterization of 
mind-reading. I understand mind-reading here as a capacity to attribute mental states to human 
beings based on behavioral observations and evidence of the situation/environment. To illustrate 
this take this simple mind-reading story by Jordi Fernández (2013, p. 4): 
“Suppose that one of the things that you believe about me is that I want Barcelona FC to win 
the UEFA Champions League. Suppose, furthermore, that your belief is justified. What could 
justify your belief? Perhaps you heard me express that desire, or you observed me screaming 
at the TV while we watched one of the Champions League games, or you noticed my mood 
when I read in the news that the team was not doing so well in that competition.” 
(Fernández, 2013, p. 4) 
 
Whatever can justify your belief about his mental state has to be something you observed. You 
cannot directly access his mental state, but rather you need to base it on the evidence you gather by 
perception. You can listen to his testimony and you can see him get emotional when watching the 
game. Perhaps even facial expressions showing his mood can be sufficient if you know enough about 
the situation he is in right now. Crucially, the mental state attribution is based on things other than 
the mental state attributed. Plausibly they are not completely unrelated – his emotional reaction is 
connected to the desire that Barcelona FC wins – but they are different things. This is not to say that 
mental states cannot play any role in mind-reading processes. Rather, the mental state that should 
be attributed at the end of a process cannot itself be the input of the very same process. If I ascribe 
mental state M1 by process P1 at t1 I can later on use M1 in process P2 at t2 to ascribe M2. For instance, 
I ascribe the desire for Barcelona FC to win the Champions League to Jordi Fernández based on his 
 
9 Some argue for a distinct method of knowing other people’s mental states that is not inferential mind-reading 
(cf. Spaulding (2015)). I will not consider these options. 
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behavior while watching a football game. Then later on I see him celebrating after the game finished. 
I can now use the previously ascribed desire to figure out that he is happy that Barcelona FC won. 
Mind-reading approaches that start with behavioral observation plus evidence of the situation come 
in two varieties: As theory-theory accounts (e.g. Gopnik and Wellman (1994; 2012), Gopnik and 
Meltzoff (1997)) and as simulation accounts (e.g. Goldman (2006)). Both differ in what is done with 
the observational input, but for my purpose the focus is on the input itself. So I can work with a very 
simplified black-box model. 
 
The model can be self-directed, so it is possible to self-ascribe a mental state based on behavioral 
observation and a grasp of the current situation. A standard example for this type of case is Wright’s 
explanation of a scene in Jane Austen’s Emma: 
Emma has just been told of the love of her protégée, Harriet, for her — Emma's — bachelor 
brother‐in‐law, a decade older than Emma, a frequent guest of her father's, and hitherto a 
stable, somewhat avuncular part of the background to her life. She has entertained no 
thought of him as a possible husband. But now she realizes that she strongly desires that he 
marry no one but her, and she arrives at this discovery by way of surprise at the strength and 
color of her reaction to Harriet's declaration, and by way of a few minutes' reflection on that 
reaction. She is, precisely, not moved to the realization immediately; it dawns on her as 
something she first suspects and then recognizes as true. It explains her reaction to Harriet. 
(Wright, 1998, pp. 16-17) 
 
With self-directed mind-reading in the mix, how can we tell a mind-reading story of Otto’s self-
ascription? Otto simply looks at the notebook and avows that he believes the museum is at 53 rd 
street. There is no strong, colorful reaction to the notebook that Otto then can interpret in such a 










that the museum is at the 53rd street. But that reaction already presupposes what the mind-reading 
process wants to get at. It is useless as a basis for a mind-reading process. What other behavior can 
be considered as the basis for Otto? Perhaps he can base his mind-reading on previous instances of 
looking at the notebook. In the past he read the notebook and acted accordingly. But is this enough 
as a basis? I doubt it. While he might get to the general conclusion that usually he acts according to 
what is written in the notebook, there is no way this general claim can lead him to the specific 
attribution of a belief that p. Where should the propositional content come from, if his basis is a 
general claim? 
The obvious amendment is to let the content written in the notebook play a role in the explanation. 
So the general observation of Otto’s past behavior plus the fact that p is written in the notebook are 
the input for the mind-reading process. The output is then the self-ascription that he believes that p 
– that the museum is at 53rd street in this case. 
But this is no good either. There are red flags for both parts of the input. First, it does not seem 
obvious whether Otto can use his past behavior at all as an input. Otto has Alzheimer’s after all. How 
can we let any representation of his past behavior play a crucial role in the belief-production if it is 
unclear whether his memory supports any such representation? If Otto needs a notebook to 
remember where the museum is, he likely won’t be able to remember how he behaved in the past. 
We can imagine him writing down all his behavior in the past as well, but that seems unnecessary in 
our story about Otto’s self-ascription. The story is complete without him also checking the notebook 
for his previous behavior. 
Second, if we accept that p written in the notebook plays a role as input, we might be already 
stepping away from mind-reading. Remember that the mental state attributed at the end of the 
mind-reading process cannot be already the input. If we let the notebook play such a pivotal role as 
input, we are in danger to abandoning this general rule, because the notebook stating that p is part 
of the extended belief that Otto wants to self-ascribe. This means that Otto would effectively use his 
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extended belief to self-ascribe the very same belief. While this perfectly fits the story, it does not tell 
a mind-reading tale anymore. Instead we have to deal with Otto directly detecting his own extended 
belief. He bases his second-order belief on his first-order belief. Suddenly the mind-reading approach 
no longer seems appropriate. 
The proponent of the mind-reading solution can attempt to save his account by implementing a 
different move. It is not the present behavior that Otto interprets, but rather his past behavior. That 
there is something written in the notebook is evidence of his own past action of writing down the 
location of the museum. When Otto recognizes what is written in the notebook, he recognizes that 
this is something that he wrote and hence, that he believes. In this case he bases his self-ascription 
on the evidence of his prior action. The first problem with this solution is that it heavily relies on Otto 
having written that p into the notebook earlier. However, as I noted before, the previous 
endorsement condition is not all that necessary according to Clark and Chalmers. And if there is no 
previous endorsement condition, then there can be cases in which the writing in the notebook is no 
evidence of Otto’s past actions. Second, in some cases Otto will not be able to tell whether he wrote 
p into the notebook. Just think of notes on a smartphone. There is no handwriting that can be 
recognized as something Otto himself wrote. Nevertheless, he can have beliefs extended to the 
notes on the smartphone and be unable to rule out that someone else wrote them. It seems that he 
does not need to know who put the notes in there. If this is correct, then he cannot use these notes 
as results from his past actions. Hence, he cannot use them as a basis for self-directed mind-reading. 
I showed that both the introspection and the mind-reading approach fail to capture extended 
introspection appropriately. What are we supposed to do now? I believe there are four options 
available, with little to go in favor of each. 




2) We can change our account of mind-reading, such that we can allow the ascribed belief to 
already be a part of the input in some sense. 
3) We can get rid of the idea of extended belief altogether, and stick to our guns for 
introspection and mind-reading. 
4) We can propose that extended introspection needs its own, distinct account of producing 
self-knowledge. 
It is a difficult dialectic position to be in. Moreover, if one looks at the individual debates, then one 
can find independent motivation for every single of these options. One can accept that introspection 
does not come with this sort of privileged- and peculiar access in general with Carruthers (2011), 
Cassam (2014), or Schwitzgebel (2008) and go for (1). One can adapt ideas from direct social 
perception of mental states such as presented in Krueger (2012) or Spaulding (2015) and go for (2). 
One can get rid of extended minds with Gertler (2007) or Adams and Aizawa (2010) and go for option 
(3). I, however, want to opt for (4). The reasoning is largely defensive. If one chooses option (4), one 
need not change any independently motivated position. Therefore, (4) is the least invasive way to go. 
I can avoid the internal debates of introspection, mind-reading, and extended mind for the bargain of 
accepting a new source of self-knowledge: Extended Introspection. 
Extended Introspection Sui Generis 
Perhaps it should not surprise us that both introspection and mind-reading do not work for our story 
about Otto. Why expect a phenomenon to fit an explanation that was modeled after very different 
cases? So let’s start looking at the case and build an account from the bottom up. 
The main idea is to describe what is going on in the Otto case and then transform this description 
into a general principle or rule. This approach is not entirely original. Rather, it is a staple in the 
epistemologist’s toolbox to build epistemic rules out of cases, where an epistemic rule is simply a 
rule of belief formation.  
For instance, we can start with the following story taken from Alex Byrne (2005, p. 93): 
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Mrs. Hudson might hear the doorbell ring, and conclude that there is someone at the door. 
By hearing that the doorbell is ringing, Mrs. Hudson knows that the doorbell is ringing; by 
reasoning, she knows that there is someone at the door. 
 
This case is straightforward. Mrs. Hudson believes that someone is at the door, because the doorbell 
rings. We can transform this into a rule that Mrs. Hudson follows:  
DOORBELL  If the doorbell rings, believe that there is someone at the door. 
It is easy to see that this rule fits the case. Mrs. Hudson’s belief formation can be described as her 
following this conditional, whereas following the conditional means that she forms the consequent 
belief because she recognizes that the antecedent condition holds. Generalizing this, Byrne (2005, p. 
94) states that  
S follows the Rule R (‘If conditions C obtain, believe that p’) on a particular occasion iff on that 
occasion: 
a. S believes that p because she recognizes that conditions C obtain 
Which implies: 
b. S recognizes (hence knows) that conditions C obtain 
c. Conditions C obtain 
d. S believes that p 
DOORBELL happens to be a good rule, that is, it usually produces true beliefs. On the other hand, you 
can think of bad rules that produce false beliefs most of the time. For instance, “If you are hungry, 
believe that it is sunny outside” is a rule that will not generate true beliefs in general. There are 
simply too many instances in which you are hungry, but it is not sunny outside. In other words, the 
rule is unreliable. 




Otto suffers from Alzheimer's disease, and like many Alzheimer's patients, he relies on 
information in the environment to help structure his life. Otto carries a notebook around 
with him everywhere he goes. When he learns new information, he writes it down. When he 
needs some old information, he looks it up. For Otto, his notebook plays the role usually 
played by a biological memory. I ask Otto whether he believes that the museum is on 53rd 
Street. Otto looks at his notebook and answers “I believe the museum is on 53rd Street.” 
 
Just as I described Mrs. Hudson’s belief formation, I can now describe Otto’s belief formation as a 
two-step process. Otto looks at his notebook, and then self-ascribes a belief because of what is 
written in the notebook. He recognizes that the notebook says that p, and transitions, by reasoning, 
to the belief that he believes that p. He thereby fits the following rule: 
NOTEBOOK  If your notebook says that p, believe that you believe that p. 
Otto believes that he believes that p, because he recognizes that his notebook says that p. This looks 
quite similar to Byrne’s (2005) general rule BEL: If p, believe that you believe that p (Byrne, 2005, p. 
95). There is a sense in which it is just an instance of BEL, because Otto recognizes that p by looking 
at the notebook. However, I do not opt to use BEL here. My rationale is twofold. First, BEL shows a 
very strong asymmetry between a first person formulation and a third person version. We already 
saw that the case of extended introspection does not fit with this asymmetry to such an extent. 
NOTEBOOK on the other hand captures the close similarity to a third-person rule that fits our initial 
intuition that extended introspection is not quite as privileged and special as genuine introspection. 
Second, NOTEBOOK can provide additional insights to the Otto case. Both reasons will become 
apparent in this section. 
So far NOTEBOOK looks just like DOORBELL. However, it is more than the simple DOORBELL rule. 
NOTEBOOK is a very special rule, if one supposes that the conditions for extended beliefs are 
satisfied for Otto. Remember conditions (ii) and (iii) that external aids have to satisfy for an extended 
belief. The external aid has to be (ii) readily accessible, and (iii) automatically endorsed. (ii) plays an 
important role in making it possible to follow NOTEBOOK. Epistemic rules in general do not say 
whether they can actually be followed. DOORBELL, for instance, gives you a conditional that provides 
a transition from recognizing the doorbell ringing to a belief that will likely be true, if the antecedent 
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holds. But you might not be able to recognize that the doorbell is ringing. You could be deaf, or 
simply listening to music on headphones on a volume that makes it impossible to hear the doorbell. 
Nothing guarantees that a good rule is one that you can follow. However, this is different for 
extended believing Otto and the NOTEBOOK rule. Otto is guaranteed to be able to follow NOTEBOOK 
reliably with regard to recognizing the antecedent.10 The argument for this is rather simple: 
1) Otto has a belief extending to the content of his notebook. (Assumption) 
2) Otto’s belief can only be extended if the content of the notebook is readily accessible. 
(Conditions for Extended Belief) 
3) Otto can readily access the content of the notebook (from 1, 2) 
4) If the content of the notebook is readily accessible, then Otto can reliably recognize that the 
notebook says that p, if it says that p. (Spelling out Accessibility) 
 
5) Otto can reliably recognize that the notebook says that p, if it says that p. (from 3, 4) 
The argument shows that Otto is able to reliably recognize that the antecedent of the NOTEBOOK 
rule holds, if it holds. He can do so in virtue of the extended belief condition that makes the 
notebook readily accessible. The only step in the argument that is not an assumption or already 
independently argued for is (4), but I take this to be intuitively true. What else could it mean to be 
able to readily access a notebook, if not that I can reliably recognize that the notebook says that p, if 
it does say that p?11 
That Otto can reliably recognize that the notebook says that p is not enough to guarantee that he can 
reliably follow NOTEBOOK completely. He further needs to be able to follow the conditional and form 
 
10 It is important to highlight the difference between a rule being reliable and one being able to follow the rule 
reliably. The rule is reliable (good) if it mostly produces true beliefs. On the other hand, one can follow an 
inferential rule reliably if one usually is in a position to follow it. One can reliably follow a reliable rule, but one 
can also reliably follow an unreliable rule. The same goes for being unable to reliably follow a rule. 
11 In earlier versions I was tempted to read the ready access condition stronger than merely reliable access. 
However, that would be against Clark and Chalmers (1998) intention of providing a parallel to biological 
memory. Clark (2010) uses reliable access instead of ready access to avoid this confusion. Thanks to Brie 
Gertler for pointing this out. 
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a belief according to the conditional. This is not worrisome at all. As long as Otto is able to reason, he 
is able to follow a conditional just fine. 
So far I established that Otto can reliably follow NOTEBOOK, given that he has beliefs extending to 
his notebook. However, I still need to provide reasons why NOTEBOOK is actually a good epistemic 
rule. Why should NOTEBOOK generate true rather than false beliefs?  Here I take another condition 
of extended belief to play the pivotal role. This time it is condition (iii), the automatic endorsement 
condition. The idea is that whenever Otto looks into his notebook and reads that p, he automatically 
endorses that p and thereby is guaranteed to believe that p. This can be used in an argument as 
follows: 
1) Otto automatically endorses that p, if he reads that p in his notebook. (Condition of Extended 
Belief) 
2) Endorsing that p entails believing that p. (Spelling out Endorsement) 
3) Otto reads that p in his notebook. (Assumption) 
4) Otto endorses that p. (from 1, 3) 
5) Otto believes that p. (from 2, 4) 
 
6) If Otto reads that p in his notebook, he believes that p. (from 3, 4, 5) 
This conclusion shows that NOTEBOOK is actually a good epistemic rule. It is good, because the 
consequent belief will always be true when Otto follows the rule. Whenever Otto follows 
NOTEBOOK, he starts by looking at the notebook which says that p. Otto recognizes that p and 
automatically endorses it. This endorsement guarantees that he believes that p. So when Otto 
follows the conditional and forms the belief that he believes that p, he will be correct. Following 
NOTEBOOK is infallible, because the mere act of following the rule guarantees the second-order 
belief to be true by securing the first-order belief. 
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A crucial step in the argument is (2), which depends on the notion of endorsement in play. Clark and 
Chalmers (1998) do not provide much information in this regard. However, Clark (2010) says that 
endorsement means that “It should not usually be subject to critical scrutiny (unlike the opinions of 
other people, for example). It should be deemed about as trustworthy as something retrieved clearly 
from biological memory” (Clark, 2010, p. 46). I take this to entail belief, insofar as it is equal to 
regarding p as true. If Otto recognizes that the notebook says that p, he holds p to be true without 
additional, critical scrutiny. He will use p as a premise in practical and theoretical reasoning, the same 
as if he would hold p to be true based on any other source. This should be uncontroversial, given that 
I assume that the extended mind thesis is true. 
Behind this argument lies a general observation of the Otto case. If Otto self-ascribes a belief by 
looking at the notebook two usually12 unrelated factors coincide. On one hand there is the ground for 
a belief. For instance, I can form a perceptual belief based on a perceptual seeming. I form the belief 
that the sun is shining, because I have a visual experience of the sun shining. This is my evidence that 
I base my belief on. However, on the other hand there is an external fact that makes the belief true. 
My belief that the sun is shining is true, if the sun is in fact shining. This truthmaker is different from 
the basis of my belief. In the Otto case things seem different. The very same thing that Otto bases his 
second-order belief on also makes this second-order belief true. He looks at the notebook and 
believes that he believes that p because of the notebook saying that p. At the same time the 
notebook makes it the case that he believes that p, thereby making his second-order belief true. This 
makes it difficult for Otto to be wrong about himself, if he self-ascribes by looking at the notebook. 
The external aid is both the basis and the truthmaker for his self-ascription. Here even the most 
determined sceptic cannot find a gap in which to insert his knife – as long as the sceptic is on board 
with extended beliefs in general. 
I established that NOTEBOOK is an epistemic rule that Otto can reliably follow, and moreover a good, 
truth-conducive rule. However, where does NOTEBOOK put extended introspection with respect to 
 
12 Even though not always. One might argue that the same thing happens if I form beliefs about my qualia. 
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privileged and peculiar access? To answer this I want to look at third person equivalents to the 
NOTEBOOK rule. After all, the prior intuition was that there is nothing special about Otto looking at 
the notebook compared to me looking at the notebook. So perhaps there is a similar epistemic rule 
for me. And I believe there is, let’s call it O-NOTEBOOK. 
O-NOTEBOOK  If Otto’s notebook says that p, believe that Otto believes that p. 
Under the assumption that Otto has beliefs extended to the notebook, O-NOTEBOOK also looks like a 
very good rule. If I look at Otto’s notebook and recognize that it says that p, then it will be true that 
Otto believes that p. It will be true, because by the assumption of extended beliefs whatever is 
written in the notebook constitutes dispositional beliefs of Otto, just the same way something stored 
in biological memory would. However, there are some differences to NOTEBOOK. First, O-NOTEBOOK 
plus the assumption that Otto has extended beliefs does not guarantee that one can reliably follow 
the rule. Whereas Otto can reliably follow NOTEBOOK in virtue of the extended mind conditions, 
there is no condition that guarantees me any access to Otto’s notebook. Hence, I might not be able 
to recognize the antecedent of the conditional in a large number of cases. 
Second, Otto can ascribe occurrent beliefs by using NOTEBOOK, whereas O-NOTEBOOK cannot do the 
same. The idea here is that whenever Otto looks at his notebook to follow his NOTEBOOK rule he 
thereby endorses the content right at that moment. That is, the endorsement, and thereby the belief 
that p, plays an active role in Otto’s cognitive machinery at the moment of him following NOTEBOOK. 
Moreover, it is plausible that Otto will be consciously aware of his belief that p, when he follows 
NOTEBOOK. On the other hand, if I look at Otto’s notebook, there is no way for me to tell whether 
Otto believes that p occurrently or dispositionally. It is possible that I ascribe to Otto the belief that p 
by looking at his notebook, while at that moment Otto himself does not look at the notebook at all 
and is thinking about something completely unrelated to p. In this case, I can still correctly ascribe a 
belief that p to Otto, but only a dispositional belief. The difference can be spelled out by expanding 
both epistemic rules: 
22 
 
NOTEBOOK*  If your notebook says that p, believe that you occurrently believe that p. 
O-NOTEBOOK*  If Otto’s notebook says that p, believe that Otto occurrently believes that p. 
NOTEBOOK* is a good rule, whereas O-NOTEBOOK* is not. The former will produce mostly (always) 
true beliefs, but the latter generates a ton of false beliefs in cases where I follow O-NOTEBOOK* 
when Otto does not look at his notebook. Hence there is a difference between NOTEBOOK and O-
NOTEBOOK insofar as they both use a general notion of ‘belief’, but have different types of beliefs as 
truthmakers in general. 
With these differences in mind I can confidently say that there is something peculiar and special 
about extended introspection. But it is only a minor difference. Nothing guarantees that I can reliably 
follow the third person equivalent to Otto’s NOTEBOOK rule. Moreover, even when I can follow O-
NOTEBOOK, I cannot employ quite the same method as Otto. However, I can do something in the 
vicinity, closely resembling Otto’s belief formation. And I can be reliable as well; I am just limited in 
the range of reliable extended mental state ascriptions. I cannot reliably ascribe occurrent states 
based on Otto’s external aids, but I can reliably attribute his extended beliefs in general. The result is 
somewhere in-between the features that ordinary self-knowledge and mind-reading are said to 
possess. It is not quite as peculiar as self-knowledge based on usual introspection, but there is still 
some difference between the first-personal access and the third-personal one. 
From Otto to Otto++ 
So far I have discussed the extended introspection case for Otto and his notebook. Earlier on I 
remarked that the same strategy that works as an explanation for extended introspection in the case 
of Otto and his notebook also works for Smart’s (2018) case of Otto++, who has information stored 
online on a personal cloud service that can be accessed via smartphones, smartwatches or 
augmented reality glasses. Otto++ has sufficient access to the information via these devices to satisfy 
conditions (i) to (iii). Otto++ poses two interesting challenges. First, can we come up with an 
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epistemic rule for extended introspection that fits the case?  And second, is there still the same kind 
of privilege involved in this case? 
To answer the first question, I propose to use an analog to the NOTEBOOK rule: 
CLOUD  If your cloud-based data store says that p, believe that you believe that p. 
We have to be liberal in interpreting the phrase “if your cloud-based data store says […].” The idea is 
that this phrase covers all cloud-based information being presented by any device that is sufficiently 
connected to that cloud-based store. The antecedent can be satisfied if your smartphone app 
connected to the cloud-based data store shows you that p, but also if the augmented reality glasses 
tell you that p, or a device produces sounds providing you with the information that p. In all of these 
cases the same arguments I provided for the notebook case can be applied in relation to the CLOUD 
rule. If you have beliefs extended to the cloud-based data store satisfying conditions (i) to (iii), you 
will be in a position to reliably follow the rule CLOUD. Moreover, you will automatically endorse the 
content provided by the cloud-based data store and therefore believe that p whenever you follow 
the rule. 
Other people will also be able to come to know Otto++’s beliefs by accessing his cloud-based data 
store. So we get the third-person rule for Otto++: 
O-CLOUD If Otto++’s cloud-based data store says that p, believe that Otto++ believes 
that p. 
However, just as with O-NOTEBOOK, there is no guarantee that I am able to reliably follow O-CLOUD. 
On the other hand, the conditions for extended belief guarantee that Otto++ can reliably follow 
CLOUD. Hence, Otto++ is privileged with regard to his cloud-based beliefs just like Otto is with regard 
to his notebook-based beliefs. 
In addition, Otto++ is also privileged with regard to his occurrent beliefs. To see this, consider the 
rule for occurrent beliefs: 
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CLOUD* If your cloud-based data store says that p, believe that you occurrently 
believe that p. 
For the same reasons as in NOTEBOOK* the rule CLOUD* will be a good rule and produce true 
beliefs, whereas the third-person equivalent O-CLOUD* will not. 
O-CLOUD* If Otto++’s cloud-based data store says that p, believe that Otto++ 
occurrently believes that p. 
Just as in the notebook case, CLOUD* is a good rule, but O-CLOUD* is not. Following O-CLOUD* does 
not reliably lead to true beliefs. Hence, Otto++ is also privileged with regard to the occurrent nature 
of his extended beliefs. Overall, Otto++ has privileged access to his extended beliefs similar to Otto in 
the notebook case, hence I found my answer the first question. 
To answer the second question, I want to consider the following scenario. Suppose that the FBI can 
observe Otto++ constantly by utilizing the technological gadgets Otto++ uses. The augmented reality 
glasses have accessible cameras built in that are always filming Otto++ and the FBI can use his 
smartphone to listen in on what he says at all times. Finally, suppose that they use well developed 
computer programs and well trained agents to infer Otto++’s mental states from the observed 
behavior. In this scenario the FBI seems to be in an especially good position to know Otto++’s mental 
states. With all these surveillance tools the FBI might be able to get to know Otto++ even better than 
Otto++ knows himself. Is this a problem for the claim that extended introspection is privileged?13 I do 
not think so. I am willing to grant that someone could come to know more about Otto++’s beliefs 
than he himself knows. And the constant observation via wearable technology seems to be a 
plausible scenario in which that is the case. However, this does not threaten the privileged access 
Otto++ has to his extended and non-extended beliefs. We should not understand privileged access as 
having an especially high number of justified true beliefs about one’s mental states. Rather, following 
Byrne (2005), I suggest that we should understand privileged access as beliefs formed by 
 
13 Thank you to a reviewer who raised this issue. 
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introspection being especially likely to amount to knowledge. There is less of a chance for making a 
mistake when introspecting. This is also the case for extended introspection. CLOUD is a rule that is 
self-verifying under extended belief condition. If Otto++ follows CLOUD he will end up with a true 
belief. Moreover, the conditions for having beliefs extended to the cloud-based data store guarantee 
that Otto++ can reliably follow the rule. Nothing guarantees that anyone else can follow the third-
person rule O-CLOUD. One might respond here that O-CLOUD does not seem to be a difficult rule to 
follow, especially for someone who is able to observe everything that Otto++ does at any given time. 
But even in that case, at best one could be on par with Otto++ with regard to his dispositional beliefs. 
Otto++ is still privileged with regard to occurrent beliefs formed by CLOUD*. Otto++’s observable 
behavior will merely provide you with a reasonable basis to infer Otto++’s occurrent beliefs, but this 
basis underdetermines his actual mental states. Any behavior that might indicate that Otto++ likely 
accesses information (e.g. all the mechanical steps that lead to the information being displayed plus 
his eye movement) could happen without any information being accessed. Otto++ might look as if he 
accesses information from the cloud when he actually does not. Hence, there is no third-personal 
path to know whether Otto++ occurrently believes that p that can compete with Otto++’s privileged 
access. Otto++ can use CLOUD* and thereby accurately find out that he occurrently believes that p. 
Hence, there is still room for Otto++’s privileged access. 
Conclusion 
I showed that a straightforward interpretation of extended introspection as genuine introspection is 
not appropriate. Furthermore, a self-directed mind-reading story does not fit either. This left us with 
four distinct options. We can change our accounts of introspection and mind-reading, deny the 
extended-mind thesis, or propose a sui generis form of extended introspection. I chose the latter. 
Therefore, I proposed an original account of extended introspection based on epistemic rules. I 
provided a rule for the Otto example, and argued that this happens to be a rule that Otto can follow 
and that generates true beliefs. Both are secured by the requirements of extended beliefs. If Otto has 
extended beliefs, then he can reliably follow the NOTEBOOK rule which leads him to true beliefs 
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about his mental states. Finally, I showed how this picture fits the ideas of privileged and peculiar 
access. Otto is privileged, because having beliefs extended to the notebook (plus reasoning) 
guarantees that he can reliably follow the NOTEBOOK rule. Furthermore, he is in a special position 
because he can attribute that a belief is occurrent based on NOTEBOOK, whereas a third-person 
variation of the rule, O-NOTEBOOK, cannot do the same. It is still an open question to what extent 
this result can generalize to other cognitively integrated artifacts. This is mainly a question of 
whether (i)-(iii) hold for all extended mental states, or whether some artifact can be integrated 
enough to count as part of the mind without satisfying (i)-(iii). Plausibly, widespread technology such 
as smartphones and smartwatches fit these conditions to some extent. In particular I argued that it 
does generalize to Smart’s (2018) Otto++ case, which satisfies (i) to (iii). The other open question is 
how extended beliefs can be combined with an agential account of self-knowledge. I leave this to 
future work. 
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